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A Non-Interactive Quantum Bit Commitment Scheme that Exploits the
Computational Hardness of Quantum State Distinction
Tomoyuki Yamakami∗
Abstract: We propose an efficient quantum protocol performing quantum bit commitment, which is a
simple cryptographic primitive involved with two parties, called a committer and a verifier. Our protocol
is non-interactive, uses no supplemental shared information, and achieves computational concealing and
statistical binding under a natural complexity-theoretical assumption. An earlier protocol in the liter-
ature relies on the existence of an efficient quantum one-way function. Our protocol, on the contrary,
exploits a seemingly weaker assumption on computational difficulty of distinguishing two specific ensem-
bles of reduced quantum states. This assumption is guaranteed by, for example, computational hardness
of solving the graph automorphism problem efficiently on a quantum computer.
Keywords. quantum bit commitment, quantum computation, distinction problem, graph automor-
phism, computational concealing, statistical binding
1 Introduction
Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive between two parties and its schemes have been
applied to build other useful cryptographic protocols, including secure coin flipping, zero-knowledge proofs,
secure multiparty computation, signature schemes, and secret sharing. A protocol for the bit commitment
demands the following two security notions: concealing and binding. In a committing phase, Alice (commit-
ter) first commits a bit and sends Bob (verifier) its encrypted information, from which Bob cannot decipher
her bit. In an opening phase, she reveals her bit; however, Bob can detect her wrongdoing if she presents
the bit different from what she had committed in the earlier phase.
A quantum key distribution scheme [1] is well-known to be unconditionally secure, whereas it is proven
that no quantum bit commitment scheme achieves unconditional security [9, 13]. Chailloux and Kerenidis
[3] recently argued that no protocol for quantum bit commitment achieves a cheating probability of less than
0.739. These facts immediately prompt us to seek a reasonable means to build practically durable protocols
for quantum bit commitment. Technological limitations of current quantum device, on one hand, have been
used to design feasible protocols in, e.g., [6, 7]. Dumais, Mayers, and Salvail [8], on the other hand, used
a computationally difficult problem to construct a (non-interactive) protocol for quantum bit commitment.
Their protocol requires the total communication cost of O(n) qubits, where n is a security parameter, and
the security of the protocol relies on the existence of quantum one-way permutation (namely, a function that
permutes a given set of strings with the one-way property that the function is easily computed buy is hard
to be inverted). In particular, the binding condition for the protocol is proven as follows. If the condition
does not hold, then Alice must have a strategy to deceive Bob. Using her strategy, we can efficiently invert
a given quantum one-way permutation on a quantum computer, leading to a contradiction. This protocol
was later extended by Tanaka [14] to quantum string commitment using an additional technique of quantum
fingerprinting to reduce the communication cost between Alice and Bob. Recently, Koshiba and Odaira [12]
reduced this assumption to the existence of quantum one-way functions.
Whether a quantum one-way permutation exists is still an open question and it seems quite difficult to
settle down the question. Naturally, we can ask if a use of quantum one-way permutation can be replaced
by any other (seemingly weaker) computational assumption. In this paper, we look for other means to
construct a quantum bit commitment protocol; in particular, we are interested in a computational problem
of distinguishing between two ensembles of quantum states. This type of problem has been used to guarantee
the security of quantum protocols. Chailloux, Kerenidis, and Rosgen [4] drew from a slightly technical
assumption of QSZK * QMA,† which is not known to be true, a conclusion that a scheme for “auxiliary-
input” quantum bit commitment (which allows Alice and Bob to apply the same POVM operations during
the committing phase) exists. The purpose of this paper is to present a new scheme for quantum bit
commitment with no such auxiliary inputs.
In 2005, Kawachi, Koshiba, Nishimura, and Yamakami [11] devised two special ensembles of (reduced)
quantum states and, from these ensembles, they built a quantum public-key cryptosystem whose security relies
on a computational assumption that the ensembles are hard to distinguish efficiently. These ensembles posses
∗Present Affiliation: Department of Information Science, University of Fukui, 3-9-1 Bunkyo, Fukui 910-8507, Japan
†This statement means that there exists a quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system that cannot be expressed as a
form of quantum Merlin-Arthur proof system.
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quite useful properties (stated in Section 3.1), which are interesting on its own light and have been sought for
other applications. As such an application, we actually use the two ensembles to build the aforementioned new
scheme for quantum bit commitment. Our scheme, given in Section 3.3, is non-interactive, uses no auxiliary
inputs, and achieves computational concealing and statistical binding at communication cost of O(n log n)
qubits. Those security conditions of our scheme follows from an assumption on computational hardness of
distinguishing the two ensembles. Note that, if this hardness assumption fails to hold, then, for example,
we can efficiently solve on a quantum computer a classical problem, known as the graph automorphism
problem (GA), in which we are asked to determine whether a given undirected graph is isomorphic to itself.
This problem is not yet known to be either polynomial-time solvable or NP-complete. More importantly, our
scheme has a concrete, explicit description, independent of the correctness of the assumption, and potentially
it might be applied to other fields.
The computationally concealing condition for our scheme follows directly from the indistinguishability of
two encrypted quantum states produced for two different committed bits 0 and 1. The statistical binding
condition is met by an application of state partitioning, which is a means to partition a given quantum state
into two specific orthogonal states. The details of the security conditions will be given in Section 4.
2 Main Theorem
Throughout this paper, we will work with various finite dimensional Hilbert spaces. For instance, H2
denotes the 2-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by a binary basis {|0〉, |1〉}; that is, H2 = span{|0〉, |1〉}.
We use Dirac’s ket notation |φ〉 to express quantum states and 〈φ| for the conjugate transpose of |φ〉. The
notation 〈φ|ψ〉 expresses the inner product of |φ〉 and |ψ〉. The norm of |φ〉 is given as ‖|φ〉‖ =
√
〈φ|ψ〉.
An orthogonal measurement (or von Neumann measurement) of a quantum state is described by a set of
orthogonal projections acting on a given Hilbert space.
We will use informal term of quantum algorithms to describe transformations of quantum bits (or qubits)
throughout this paper. A quantum algorithm has been often modeled by a mechanical device of quantum
Turing machine [2] or quantum circuit families [15]. We are particularly interested in quantum algorithms
that terminate within a polynomial number of steps with respect to the size of input instances. We call such
algorithms polynomial-time algorithms.
We choose the following definition for the computationally concealing condition, because this captures a
more intuitive notion of Bob being unable to gaining any significant amount of information out of Alice. As
we will show in Lemma 4.2, this definition comes from the indistinguishability between two quantum states
sent from Alice.
In a committing phase, Alice encodes her committed bit a into a quantum state and sends its (possibly
reduced) state χa to Bob. We demand the following security against Bob.
Definition 2.1 (computational concealing) A non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme is compu-
tationally concealing if, for any positive polynomial p, there is no polynomial-time quantum algorithm that
outputs a from instance χa with error probability at least 1/2 + 1/p(n) for any n ∈ N+.
The security against Alice requires the following notion of statistical binding. In the committing phase,
Alice starts with |0〉. She applies a quantum transformation U1 and sends a subsystem Hcommit. At
the beginning of an opening phase (or a revealing phase), Alice applies U
(a)
2 , where a ∈ {0, 1}, if she
wants to convince Bob that her committed bit is a. Alice’s cheating strategy is modeled by a triplet
U = (U1, U (0)2 , U (1)2 ). Let T (U)a (n) be the probability that Bob convinces himself that a is truly a committed
bit, provided that Bob faithfully follows the scheme.
Definition 2.2 (statistical binding) A non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme is statistically bind-
ing if there exists a negligible function ε(n) such that, for any cheating strategy U = (U1, U (0)2 , U (1)2 ) of Alice,
T
(U)
0 (n) + T
(U)
1 (n) ≤ 1 + ε(n) holds for every length n ∈ N+.
Our main theorem concerns the notion of indistinguishable ensembles of quantum states which are gen-
erated efficiently. First, we introduce the necessary terminology to explain the statement.
It is time to introduce extra notions and notations. Let N+ denote the set of all positive integers and set
N = {0} ∪ N+. An ensemble {ρ(n)}n∈N+ of (reduced) quantum states is said to be efficiently generated if
there exist two polynomially-bounded‡ functions q, ℓ : N+ → N+ and a polynomial-time quantum algorithm
‡A function f : N+ → N is polynomially bounded if there exists a (positive) polynomial p for which f(n) ≤ p(n) for all
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A such that, on every input |1n〉|0〉 (n ∈ N+), (1) A generates |1n〉|Φ〉 of q(n) qubits and (2) ρ(n) is obtained
by tracing out the first ℓ(n) qubits of |Φ〉; in notation, ρ(n) = trℓ(n)(|Φ〉〈Φ|). Let {ρ(n)}n∈N+ and {χ(n)}n∈N+
be two ensembles of (reduced) quantum states. We say that a quantum algorithm A distinguishes between
{ρ(n)}n∈N+ and {χ(n)}n∈N+ with advantage δ(n) [11] if, for every n ∈ N+, it holds that
δ(n) = |Prob[A(1n, ρ(n)) = 1]− Prob[A(1n, χ(n)) = 1]| . (1)
The succinct notation A(1n, ρ(n)) in Eq. (1) formally expresses A(|1n〉〈1n| ⊗ ρ(n)).
A function µ : N → [0, 1] is called negligible if, for any positive polynomial p, µ(n) ≤ 1/p(n) holds
for all but finitely many numbers n ∈ N. If if there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that
distinguishes between two ensembles {ρ(n)}n∈N+ and {χ(n)}n∈N+ of (reduced) quantum states with non-
negligible advantage, then the two ensembles are said to be efficiently indistinguishable. Otherwise, they are
called efficiently indistinguishable.
Theorem 2.3 (main theorem) There exists a pair of efficiently generated ensembles of (reduced) quan-
tum states such that (1) they are efficiently indistinguishable and (2) from them, we can construct a non-
interactive quantum bit commitment with computationally canceling and statistically binding conditions.
In Section 3.1, we will explicitly define an ensemble pair described in Theorem 2.3. With help of [11,
Theorem 2.5], the existence of such an ensemble pair is guaranteed if the graph automorphism problem (GA)
is difficult to solve efficiently on any quantum computer. As an immediate consequence of the theorem, we
obtain the following statement.
Corollary 2.4 If no polynomial-time quantum algorithm solves GA with error probability at least 2−n,
where n is the vertex set size if an input graph, then there exists a non-interactive quantum bit commitment
with the conditions of computationally canceling and statistically binding.
In the subsequent sections, we will prove Theorem 2.3.
3 Quantum Bit Commitment
We will present a scheme for non-interactive quantum bit commitment. Our scheme is based on an ensemble
of special quantum states, introduced in [11]. In Section 3.1, we will explain these quantum states. A useful
property of state partitioning will be discussed in Section 3.2. Finally, we will present in Section 3.3 our
protocol of quantum bit commitment between Alice and Bob.
3.1 Special Quantum States with Hidden Permutations
As a preparation to our quantum bit commitment scheme, we will introduce an ensemble of special quantum
states given in [11].
Let n be any number in N+, which is used as a security parameter; for our purpose, we demand that n
is even and n/2 is odd. Let Sn denote the set of all permutations σ : [n] → [n], where [n] is the integer set
{1, 2, 3, . . . , n}. Since |Sn| = n!, every element in Sn can be expressed using at most ⌈log(n!)⌉ (= O(n log n))
qubits. The special set Kn is a subset of Sn, consisting only of π satisfying ππ = id and π(i) 6= i for all
i ∈ [n].
Given three elements s ∈ {0, 1}, σ ∈ Sn, and π ∈ Kn, we define a useful quantum state |φ(π)σ,s〉 as
|φ(π)σ,s(n)〉 =
1√
2
(|σ〉 + (−1)s|σπ〉).
For each permutation π in Kn, we partition Sn into two subsets Sˆ0 and Sˆ1, which satisfy the following
condition: for every index a ∈ {0, 1} and for all elements σ ∈ Sn, σ ∈ Sˆa implies σπ ∈ Sˆ1−a. Let S(π)n denote
one of these subsets of Sn that contains id. Notice that S
(π)
n is uniquely determined from π. It is easily
seen that the set B(π) = {|φ(π)σ,s〉 | σ ∈ S(π)n , s ∈ {0, 1}} forms a computational basis for the Hilbert space
HSn = span{|σ〉 | σ ∈ Sn}.
In what follows, we fix n ∈ N+ and π ∈ Kn. For each bit s ∈ {0, 1}, we define the quantum state
ρ(π)s (n) =
1
|Sn|
∑
σ∈Sn
|φ(π)σ,s (n)〉〈φ(π)σ,s (n)|.
n ∈ N+.
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Notice that the quantum states ρ
(π)
0 (n) and ρ
(π)
1 (n) are respectively denoted ρ
+
π (n) and ρ
−
π (n) in [11]. For
convenience, we use the notation |Φ(π)s (n)〉 to denote a pure quantum state 1√|Sn|
∑
σ∈Sn |σ〉|φ
(π)
σ,s (n)〉, which is
a purification of ρ
(π)
s , because ρ
(π)
s (n) coincides with the partial trace tr1(|Φ(π)s (n)〉〈Φ(π)s (n)|), where tr1 is the
partial trace over the first register (that is, the operator tracing out the first register). It is also useful to note
that
∑
σ∈Sn |σ〉|φ
(π)
σ,s 〉 =
∑
σ∈Sn |φ
(π)
σ,s〉|σ〉; thus, it holds that tr1(|Φ(π)s (n)〉〈Φ(π)s (n)|) = tr2(|Φ(π)s (n)〉〈Φ(π)s (n)|).
To make our notation simple, we hereafter omit “n” whenever “n” is clear from the context.
Note that any quantum state |γ〉 in HSn can be expressed as
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
σ∈Sn αa,σ,π|φ
(π)
σ,a〉 for any fixed
permutation π ∈ Kn. Basic properties of |φ(π)σ,s 〉 and |Φ(π)s 〉 are summarized in the following lemma. In the
lemma, we conveniently use two notations “∧” and “∨” to mean the logical connectives “AND” and “OR”,
respectively.
Lemma 3.1 Let n ∈ N+, s ∈ {0, 1}, π ∈ Kn, and σ, τ ∈ Sn.
1. |φ(π)σπ,s〉 = (−1)s|φ(π)σ,s 〉.
2. 〈φ(π)σ,0 |φ(π)σ,1〉 = 0.
3. 〈φ(π)σ,s |φ(π)τ,s 〉 = 1 if τ = σ; (−1)s if τ = σπ; 0 otherwise.
4. 〈φ(π)σ,0 |φ(κ)τ,0〉 = 1 if π = κ ∧ (σ = τ ∨ σ = τπ); 12 if π 6= κ ∧ (σ = τ ∨ σ = τκ ∨ σ = τπ); 0 otherwise.
5. 〈φ(π)σ,1 |φ(κ)τ,0〉 = 12 if π 6= κ ∧ (σ = τ ∨ σ = τκ); − 12 if π 6= κ ∧ (σπ = τ ∨ σπ = τκ); 0 otherwise.
Proof. (1) Since σππ = σ, it follows that
√
2|φ(π)σ,s〉 = |σππ〉 + (−1)s|σπ〉 = (−1)s[|σπ〉 + (−1)s|σππ〉] =
(−1)s√2|φ(π)σπ,s〉. This implies that |φσ,s〉 = (−1)s|φσπ,s〉, leading to the desired consequence.
(2) For simplicity, we write P for 〈φ(π)σ,0 |φ(π)σ,1〉. Note that π ∈ Kn implies σπ 6= σ because σπ = σ is
equivalent to π = id. Since 2P = (〈σ|+ 〈σπ|)(|σ〉 − |σπ〉) = 〈σ|σ〉+ 〈σπ|σ〉 − 〈σ|σπ〉 − 〈σπ|σπ〉, 2P equals 0.
(3) Consider the case of s = 0. Let P = 〈φ(π)σ,s |φ(π)τ,s 〉. Note that 2P = 2(〈σ|τ〉 + 〈σ|τπ〉) since 〈σπ|τπ〉 =
〈σ|τ〉. Since π 6= id, 〈σ|τ〉 = 1 implies 〈σ|τπ〉 = 0 and also 〈σ|τπ〉 = 1 implies 〈σ|τ〉 = 0. Thus, if either
τ = σ or τ = σπ, we have 2P = 2; otherwise, 2P = 0. The other case of s = 1 is similarly handled.
(4) By setting P = 〈φ(π)σ,0 |φ(κ)τ,0〉, we obtain 2P = 〈σ|τ〉 + 〈σ|τκ〉 + 〈σπ|τ〉 + 〈σπ|τκ〉. If π = κ, then (3)
implies the desired result. Now, assume that π 6= κ. If σ = τ , then 〈σ|τ〉 = 1 and the other terms in
the above expansion of 2P are all zeros, because π, κ 6= id and π 6= κ. From these results follows 2P = 1.
Similarly, if σ = τκ, then 〈σ|τκ〉 = 1 and the other terms are zeros; thus, we obtain 2P = 1. The remaining
case of σ = τπ is similarly handled. When all the above-mentioned cases fail, no terms in the expansion of
2P are 1. Therefore, we conclude that 2P = 0.
(5) Let P = 〈φ(π)σ,1 |φ(κ)τ,0〉. Note that 2P = 〈σ|τ〉 − 〈σπ|τ〉 + 〈σ|τκ〉 − 〈σπ|τκ〉. If π = κ, then (2) implies
2P = 0. In what follows, we assume that π 6= κ. If σ = τ , then it follows that 2P = 〈σ|τ〉 = 1 because
π, κ 6= id and π 6= κ. Thus, we obtain 2P = 1. Similarly, when σ = τκ, we obtain 2P = 〈σ|τκ〉 = 1. From
σπ = τ , it follows that 2P = −〈σπ|τ〉 = −1. Finally, we note that σπ = τκ implies 2P = −〈σπ|τκ〉 = −1.
✷
We give another useful property of |φ(π)σ,s 〉. This property will play an important role in Section 5.1.
Lemma 3.2 For fixed π ∈ Kn and σ ∈ Sn, it holds that |φ(π)σ,1〉 = 1|Kn|−1
∑
κ∈Kn(|φ
(κ)
σ,0〉 − |φ(κ)σπ,0〉).
Proof. Fix π ∈ Kn and σ ∈ Sn. Note that the value
√
2
∑
κ∈Kn(|φ
(κ)
σ,0〉 − |φ(κ)σπ,0〉) is
∑
κ∈Kn((|σ〉 −|σπ〉) + (|σκ〉 − |σπκ〉)), which equals |Kn|(|σ〉 − |σπ〉) +
∑
κ∈Kn(|σκ〉 − |σπκ〉). The last term equals∑
κ∈Kn |σκ〉 −
∑
κ∈Kn |σπκ〉. Let us consider the function f : Kn → Kn ∪ {id} defined as f(κ) = πκ. This
f satisfies the following three properties: (i) f is one-to-one, (ii) f(π) = id, and (iii) there is no element
κ ∈ Kn satisfying f(κ) = π. We conclude that f is a bijection on the restricted domain Kn−{π}. This fact
implies that
∑
κ∈Kn |σκ〉 −
∑
κ∈Kn |σπκ〉 = |σπ〉 − |σ〉.
Overall,
√
2
∑
κ∈Kn(|φ
(κ)
σ,0〉−|φ(κ)σπ,0〉) = |Kn|(|σ〉−|σπ〉)+(|σπ〉−|σ〉), which equals (|Kn|−1)(|σ〉−|σπ〉);
in other words,
√
2(|Kn| − 1)|φ(π)σ,1〉. From this equality, the lemma follows immediately. ✷
Hereafter, we will give two quantum procedures, which are useful in the description of our quantum bit
commitment scheme in Section 3.3. First, we introduce several useful unitary operations. The Hadamard
transform H acts on the system H2 as H |s〉 = 1√2 (|0〉+ (−1)s|1〉) for every bit s ∈ {0, 1}. The controlled-π
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operator Cπ acts on H2 ⊗HSn as Cπ|a〉|σ〉 = |a〉|σπ〉 if a = 1, and |a〉|σ〉 otherwise. The controlled-NOTid
operator CNOTid acts on H2 ⊗ HSn as CNOTid|a〉|σ〉 = (NOT |a〉)|σ〉 if σ = id, and |a〉|σ〉 otherwise.
Moreover, let Usgn denote a unitary operator mapping |σ〉 to (−1)sgn(σ)|σ〉, where σ ∈ Sn and sgn(σ)
is 1 (0, resp.) if σ is an even (odd, resp.) permutation in Sn. The controlled-SAWP operator C
(i,j)
swap
(with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n) exchanges the contents of the ith and jth registers among n registers; that is,
C
(i,j)
swap|s1〉 · · · |si〉 · · · |sj〉 · · · |sn〉 = |s1〉 · · · |sj〉 · · · |si〉 · · · |sn〉.
We will present two useful quantum transforms.
[Procedure 1] The following procedure P1 can generate the quantum state H = |0〉|σ〉|π〉|φ(π)σ,0〉 in the
system H2 ⊗H(1)Sn ⊗H
(2)
Sn
⊗H(3)Sn from |0〉|σ〉|π〉|id〉 if π 6= id. To |π〉|0〉|id〉 in the system H
(2)
Sn
⊗H2 ⊗H(3)Sn ,
we first apply two operators I ⊗ H ⊗ I and I ⊗ Cπ, where H is the Hadamard transform. This process
generates a quantum state 1√
2
|π〉(|0〉|id〉 + |1〉|π〉). Since π 6= id, we apply I ⊗ CNOTid and generate the
state 1√
2
|π〉|0〉(|id〉 + |π〉). Now, consider 1√
2
|σ〉(|id〉 + |π〉) in H(2)Sn ⊗ H
(3)
Sn
. Multiply σ in the first register
from the left to the second register, generating 1√
2
|σ〉(|σ〉+ |σπ〉). In the end, we obtain |0〉|σ〉|π〉|φ(π)σ,0〉 in H.
Similarly, we can generate |0〉|π〉|Φ(π)0 〉 from |0〉|π〉|0〉|id〉 in H2 ⊗ HSn ⊗ HSn ⊗ HSn by running the
following procedure P˜1. After generating the state
1√
2
|0〉(|id〉 + |π〉) as described above, we generate
1√
2|Sn|
∑
σ∈Sn |σ〉(|id〉 + |π〉). Multiply each σ in the first register to the content of the second register.
We then obtain 1√
2|Sn|
|σ〉(|σ〉 + |σπ〉), which is |Φ(π)0 〉.
[Procedure 2] There is a simple procedure P2 that transforms |φ(π)σ,s 〉 to |φ(π)σ,1−s〉 without knowing
(s, π) as follows. Initially, we have |φ(π)σ,s 〉. We apply Usgn ⊗ Usgn to |φ(π)σ,s 〉. The resulted quantum state
is 1√
2
(−1)sgn(σ)((−1)sgn(σ)|σ〉 + (−1)s+sgn(σπ)|σπ〉). Since π is an odd permutation, this state equals
1√
2
(−1)2sgn(σ)(|σ〉 + (−1)s+1|σπ〉), which is exactly |φ(π)σ,1−s〉. If we apply I ⊗ P2 to |Φ(π)s 〉, then we im-
mediately obtain |Φ(π)1−s〉.
3.2 State Partitioning
Our quantum bit commitment protocol in Section 3.3 requires a method to “partition” a given quantum
state χ in the system HSn into two orthogonal states χ0 and χ1 that satisfy an extra property. A basic
idea of state partitioning is inspired by a trapdoor property of [11, Theorem 2.1]. Let n ∈ N+ and χ be any
reduced state in HSn . This state can be expressed as χ = χ0 + χ1, where χs =
∑
σ∈S pσ|φ(π)σ,s 〉〈φ(π)σ,s | for each
bit s ∈ {0, 1}.
State Partition Algorithm: CSPA
(S1) Take an instance of the form χ′ = |π〉〈π| ⊗ χ in a system HSn ⊗ HSn . Prepare |0〉〈0| ⊗ χ′ in H =
H2 ⊗HSn ⊗HSn .
(S2) Apply H ⊗ I⊗2. Since the second register of H contains π, we can freely use the controlled-π operator
Cπ. Here, we apply C
(2,3)
swap(Cπ ⊗ I)C(2,3)swap. Finally, apply H ⊗ I⊗2.
(S3) The state |0〉〈0| ⊗ χ′ changes into |0〉〈0| ⊗ |π〉〈π| ⊗ χ0 + |1〉〈1| ⊗ |π〉〈π| ⊗ χ1. When we observe the first
register, we find 0 (resp., 1) with probability exactly 12 .
Here, we will briefly discuss the correctness of the above algorithm. Let χ be given at Step (S1). Assume
that χ =
∑
σ∈Sn
∑
s∈{0,1} pσ,s|φ(π)σ,s 〉〈φ(π)σ,s |. We introduce a new system H ⊗ H′ and let a purification of χ
in H ⊗ H′ ⊗ HSn be |Φ〉 =
∑
σ∈Sn
∑
s∈{0,1}
√
pσ,s|s〉|σ〉|φ(π)σ,s 〉. Note that χ = tr1,2(|Φ〉〈Φ|). For each fixed
s, we write |ψs〉 =
∑
σ∈Sn
√
pσ,s|s〉|σ〉|φ(π)σ,s 〉. Note that |Φ〉 = |ψ0〉 + |ψ1〉, where χs = tr1,2(|ψs〉〈ψs|) =∑
σ∈Sn
√
pσ,s|φ(π)σ,s〉〈φ(π)σ,s | for each s.
Initially, we have a state |Φ′〉 = |0〉|π〉|Φ〉, which equals ∑σ∈Sn∑s∈{0,1}√pσ|0〉|π〉|s〉|σ〉|φ(π)σ,s 〉. Since
we work on a purified state, it is convenient to expand Cπ to C˜π as follows. Let C˜π = C
(1,2)
swapC
(3,5)
swap(I ⊗
Cπ ⊗ I⊗2)C(3,5)swapC(1,2)swap. Step (S2) produces |Φ′′〉 = (H ⊗ I⊗4)C˜π(H ⊗ I⊗4)|Φ′〉. By a direct calculation, the
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quantum state (H ⊗ I⊗4)C˜π(H ⊗ I⊗4)|0〉|π〉|ψs〉 equals
1
2
∑
σ∈Sn
√
pσ,s|0〉|π〉|s〉|σ〉
(
|φ(π)σ,s〉+ |φ(π)σπ,s〉
)
+
1
2
∑
σ∈Sn
√
pσ,s|1〉|π〉|s〉|σ〉
(
|φ(π)σ,s 〉 − |φ(π)σπ,s〉
)
,
which coincides with |s〉|π〉|ψs〉 because Lemma 3.1 implies |φ(π)σ,s〉 = (−1)s|φ(π)σπ,s〉. Therefore, we conclude
that |Φ′′〉 = |0〉|π〉|ψ0〉+ |1〉|π〉|ψ1〉.
Next, we want to examine the behavior of CSPA on instance |κ〉〈κ|⊗χ given in Step (S1), where κ is dif-
ferent from π. In what follows, let κ be any element in Kn−{π}. Recall that |Φ〉 =
∑
σ∈Sn
√
pσ|s〉|σ〉|φ(π)σ,s 〉.
Here, the quantum algorithm starts with |Φ′κ〉 = |0〉|κ〉|Φ〉. Following Step (S2), we calculate (H ⊗
I⊗4)C˜κ(H ⊗ I⊗4)|0〉|π〉|ψ0〉. Note that, since the content of the second register is κ, we apply Cκ instead of
Cπ .
The algorithm CSPA produces a quantum state
∑
a∈{0,1}
1
2
√
2
∑
σ∈Sn
√
pσ,s|a〉|π〉|s〉|σ〉 ((|σ〉+ (−1)s|σπ〉) + (−1)a (|σκ〉+ (−1)s|σπκ〉)) .
This is equivalent to ∑
a∈{0,1}
1
2
∑
σ∈Sn
√
pσ,s|a〉|π〉|s〉|σ〉
(
|φ(κ)σ,a〉+ (−1)s|φ(κ)σπ,a〉
)
.
When a = 0 and s = 0, we obtain 12
∑
σ∈Sn
√
pσ,s|0〉|π〉|0〉|σ〉(|φ(κ)σ,0〉 + |φ(κ)σπ,0〉). Since 〈φ(κ)σ,0|φ(κ)σπ,0〉 = 0 by
Lemma 3.1(3), the norm of this state is
∥∥∥∥∥12
∑
σ∈Sn
√
pσ,s|0〉|π〉|0〉|σ〉
(
|φ(κ)σ,0〉+ |φ(κ)σπ,0〉
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
1
4
∑
σ∈Sn
pσ,0
(
2 + 2〈φ(κ)σ,0|φ(κ)σπ,0〉
)
=
1
2
∑
σ
pσ,0.
Similarly, when a = 0 and s = 1, the state 12
∑
σ∈Sn
√
pσ,1|0〉|π〉|1〉|σ〉(|φ(κ)σ,0〉 − |φ(κ)σπ,0〉) has norm 12
∑
σ pσ,1.
By combining those values, we conclude that the probability of observing 0 in the first register is 12
∑
σ pσ,0+
1
2
∑
σ pσ,1 =
1
2 . A similar argument proves that we observe 1 in the first register with probability exactly
1
2 .
3.3 A New Protocol
We will present a new quantum bit commitment protocol. We use the following quantum system between
Alice (committer) and Bob (verifier): Hall = HA,private ⊗ Hbit ⊗ Hopen ⊗ Hcommit ⊗ HB,private, where
HA,private is a system that is used only by Alice, Hopen holds a secret key produced by Alice, Hbit is a
1-qubit system for a committed bit by Alice, Hcommit is used to produce an encrypted information regarding
a committed bit, and HB,private is a system used only by Bob. Different from HA,private and HB,private, the
systems Hbit, Hopen, and Hcommit are accessed interchangeably by Alice and Bob at specific points during
an execution of the protocol.
Consider the following bit commitment scheme between Alice and Bob. Let n be the security parameter
on which Alice and Bob initially agree.
We intend to include the description of the ownerships of each system that makes up Hall. Moreover, we
write Hopen for the system Hopen1 ⊗Hopen2.
Committing Phase:
(C1) Initially, Alice owns the system H(C1)A = HA,private ⊗Hbit ⊗Hopen ⊗Hcommit and Bob owns H(C1)B =
HB,private. Starting with |0〉 in Hall, she randomly chooses her secret key π ∈ Kn in Hopen2.
(C2) She prepares |0〉|id〉 in Hopen1 ⊗Hcommit and generates |Φ(π)0 〉 as described in Section 3.1.
(C3) Let a be a bit that Alice wants to commit. She produces |a〉 in Hbit. She then transforms |Φ(π)0 〉 in
Hopen1 ⊗Hcommit into |Φ(π)a 〉 by applying P2 when a = 1.
(C4) She sends the system Hcommit to Bob. Bob then receives the reduced state ρ(π)a , which is called a
commitment state. Bob should protect it from decoherence until the opening phase. In the end, Alice’s
system becomes H(C4)A = HA,private ⊗Hbit ⊗Hopen and Bob’s becomes H(C4)B = Hcommit⊗HB,private.
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In the following opening phase, Alice reveals her secret bit a. Bob then checks whether it is actually the
bit committed by her in the committing phase.
Opening Phase (or Revealing Phase):
(R1) Alice’s current system is H(R1)A = HA,private ⊗Hbit ⊗Hopen and Bob’s system is H(R1)B = Hcommit ⊗
HB,private. Alice sends the system Hbit ⊗Hopen to Bob.
(R2) Alice now owns the system H(R2)A = HA,private and Bob owns H(R2)B = Hopen ⊗ Hbit ⊗ Hcommit ⊗
HB,private. Bob measures the two registers Hbit ⊗ Hopen2 on the computational basis {0, 1} ⊗ Sn.
Assume that he obtains (a, π) after the measurement. If π 6∈ Kn, then Bob declares that Alice tries to
deceive him. In what follows, we assume that π ∈ Kn.
(R3) Assume that, in the previous committing phase, Bob had received a reduced state χ in Hcommit from
Alice. Bob runs the state partition algorithm CSPA on input |0〉〈0|⊗χ inHB,private⊗Hcommit, provided
that HB,private is a 2-dimensional system.
(R4) Measure the system HB,private. If the outcome of the measurement is not a, then Bob declares that
Alice tries to deceive him.
(R5) Whenever a = 1, first apply P2 to change |Φ(π)1 〉 to |Φ(π)0 〉. Apply P˜−11 (which is given in Section 3.1)
to H2⊗Hopen⊗Hcommit. Measure the system Hopen1⊗Hcommit in state |0〉|id〉. If (0, id) is observed,
then Bob accepts a as Alice’s committed bit. Otherwise, Bob declares that Alice tries to deceive him.
In Step (R2), Bob does not observe the subsystem Hopn1 because, otherwise, the entanglement between
Hopen1 and Hcommit could be destroyed and Steps (R3) and (R5) might not work properly.
In the subsequent section, we will analyze the above protocol in details.
4 Security Analysis of the Scheme
We will examine the security of the quantum bit commitment protocol given in Section 3.3. We will show
that our protocol is computationally concealing in Section 4.1. This is a direct consequence of [11]. A more
complex analysis is required to show the statistically binding condition in 4.2.
4.1 Computationally Concealing Condition
The concealing condition for bit commitment requires that Bob cannot retrieve any information on a during
a committing phase after honest Alice commits a and sends a quantum state associated with a. Intuitively,
this condition is satisfied because Bob does not know γ, which locks the information on a inside the quantum
state, and thus there may be no way for Bob to obtain the information on a with probability higher than a
given parameter.
In our scheme, the notion of computational concealing, given in Section 2, is rephrased as follows. Our
quantum bit commitment scheme is computationally concealing if, for any positive polynomial p, there is no
polynomial-time quantum algorithm that outputs a from ρa with error probability at least 1/2+ 1/p(n) for
any n ∈ N+.
We will show that our protocol achieves the above computational concealing condition under the assump-
tion that GA is hard to solve efficiently on a quantum computer.
Theorem 4.1 Let n be an agreed security parameter. If no polynomial-time quantum algorithm solves GA
with non-negligible probability, then our scheme satisfies the computational concealing condition.
Theorem 4.1 follows from the lemma below.
Lemma 4.2 Let k ∈ N+. If no polynomial-time quantum algorithm solves GA with error probability at least
2−n, where n is the vertex set size of an input graph, then Bob cannot distinguish between {ρ(π)0 (n)⊗k}n∈N+
and {ρ(π)1 (n)⊗k}n∈N+ with advantage at least 1/p(n) for any positive polynomial p.
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Before proving Lemma 4.2, we give the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Assume that there is an efficient quantum algorithm A that produces a from
ρ
(π)
a with probability at least 1/2 + 1/p(n) for a certain fixed positive polynomial p. Let us consider the
following quantum algorithm B: on input χ ∈ {ρ(π)0 , ρ(π)1 }, run A and obtain a bit, say, a. By the property
of A, it follows that Prob[B(1n, ρ(π)a ) = a] ≥ 1/2 + 1/p(n) for each bit a ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, we obtain
|Prob[B(1n, ρ(π)0 ) = 1] − Prob[B(1n, ρ(π)1 ) = 1]| ≥ 2/p(n). Hence, we can distinguish between ρ(π)0 and ρ(π)1
with advantage at least 2/p(n). By Lemma 4.2, we conclude that GA is polynomial-time solvable on a
quantum computer with non-negligible probability. ✷
To prove Lemma 4.2, we recall the computational distinction problem QSCDff introduced by Kawachi et
al. [11]. Since we need only a restricted form of this problem, we re-formulate this problem in the following
fashion. Let k be a fixed constant in N+.
k-Quantum State Computational Distinction Problem k-QSCDff (weaker version):
◦ Instance: a string 1n and a k-fold quantum state ρ⊗k with ρ ∈ {ρ(π)0 (n), ρ(π)1 (n)} for a certain fixed
(but hidden) permutation π ∈ Kn, depending only on n, where n ∈ N+.
◦ Output: YES, if ρ = ρ(π)0 (n); NO, otherwise.
For convenience, we say that a quantum algorithm A solves k-QSCDff with advantage p(n) if A dis-
tinguishes between {ρ(π)0 (n)⊗k}n∈N+ and {ρ(π)1 (n)⊗k}n∈N+ with advantage p(n). Moreover, we say that a
quantum algorithm A solves k-QSCDff with average advantage p on length n if the average, over all π ∈ Kn
chosen uniformly at random, of the advantage with which A distinguishes between {ρ(π)0 (n)⊗k}n∈N+ and
{ρ(π)1 (n)⊗k}n∈N+ is exactly p. We note that, by combining [11, Theorem 2.2] and [11, Theorem 2.5], the
following holds.
Lemma 4.3 [11] Let k ∈ N+. If a quantum algorithm A solves k-QSCDff with average advantage at least
1/p(n) for a certain positive polynomial p, then there exists a quantum algorithm that solves GA for infinitely-
many lengths with probability at least 1− 2e−n, where e is the base of natural logarithms and n refers to the
vertex set size of an input graph of GA.
At last, we return to the proof of Lemma 4.2.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We will show the contrapositive of the lemma. Let k ∈ N+. Assume that there are
a positive polynomial p and a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A that distinguishes between ρ(π)0 (n)⊗k
and ρ
(π)
0 (n)
⊗k with advantage at least 1/p(n). In other words, we can solve k-QSCDff in polynomial time
with advantage at least 1/p(n). Lemma 4.3 therefore implies that GA is solvable for infinitely-many input
lengths n on an appropriate quantum computer in polynomial time with error probability at most 2e−n,
which is bounded from above by 2−n. ✷
4.2 Statistically Binding Condition
The binding condition for classical bit commitment requires that adversarial Alice cannot cheat Bob simply
by revealing a different bit a′ together with a different key π′ to Bob. For quantum bit commitment, Dumais
et al. [8] formulated a condition for a quantum bit commitment scheme to be statistically binding in the case
of non-interactive schemes. Other definitions for binding condition are found in, e.g., [5].
Conventionally, we say that Alice unveils a (with probability p) if, in the opening phase, Bob observes a
and convinces himself that this is truly a committed bit (with probability p).
Here, we cope with a general adversary model, proposed in [8], which describes adversarial Alice’s attack
U as a triplet (U1, U (0)2 , U (1)2 ) of unitary operators.
(1) At the beginning of the committing phase, adversarial Alice starts with the initial state |0〉 in
her system H(C1)A = HA,private ⊗ Hbit ⊗ Hopen ⊗ Hcommit. Instead of taking Steps (C1)–(C3), she
applies the unitary operator U1 to |0〉 in H(C1)A and generates a quantum state |η(C1)〉 = U1|0〉 =∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
σ∈Sn
∑
π∈Kn |ξa,π,σ〉|a〉|π〉|σ〉|γa,π,σ〉 with
∑
a,σ,π ‖|ξa,π,σ〉‖2 = 1. Since |γa,π,σ〉 ∈ HSn =
8
span{|φ(π)τ,s 〉 | τ ∈ S(π)n , s ∈ {0, 1}}, it holds that |γa,π,σ〉 =
∑
τ,s α
(a,π,σ)
τ,s |φ(π)τ,s 〉 for an appropriate set
{α(a,π,σ)τ,s }τ,s. Hence, we obtain
|η(C1)〉 =
∑
π∈Kn
∑
σ,τ∈S(pi)n
∑
a,s∈{0,1}
|ξ(τ,s)a,π,σ〉|a〉|π〉|σ〉|φ(π)τ,s 〉, (2)
where |ξ(τ,s)a,π,σ〉 = α(a,π,σ)τ,s |ξa,π,σ〉. At Step (C4), she sends the system Hcommit to Bob. The quantum
state that Bob receives from adversarial Alice is of the form χ =
∑
a,s,σ,τ,π ‖|ξ(τ,s)a,π,σ〉‖2|φ(π)τ,s 〉〈φ(π)τ,s | instead of
1
|Sn|
∑
σ |φ(π)σ,a〉〈φ(π)σ,a|.
(2) At the beginning of the opening phase, recall that Alice owns the subsystem H(R1)A = HA,private ⊗
Hbit⊗Hopen. Before sending Hbit⊗Hopen to Bob, Alice applies one of the unitary operators, U (0)2 and U (1)2 ,
in an attempt to unveil 0 and 1, respectively. Assume that Alice chooses a bit a ∈ {0, 1} and Alice tries to
apply U
(a)
2 in order to maximize the probability of unveiling a. Now, she applies U
(a)
2 ⊗ I to |η(C1)〉, where
U
(a)
2 acts on H(R1)A and I acts on Hcommit, and then obtains |η(R1)〉 = (U (a)2 × I)|η(C1)〉 in H(R1)A ⊗Hcommit.
Given Alice’s cheating strategy U = (U1, U (0)2 , U (1)2 ), for each bit a, recall that T (U)a (n) denotes the probability
that, when Alice applies (U1, U
(a)
2 ) as described above, Bob obtains a by the projection measurement in Step
(R2) (with ignoring the values of π and σ) and then accepts Alice’s bit a through Steps (R3)–(R5) (in other
words, Alice successfully unveils a). Note that 0 ≤ S0(n) + S1(n) ≤ 2.
The opening phase of our scheme, assuming that Bob honestly follows Steps (R2)–(R5), is in essence
equivalent to the process that Bob immediately measures the system Hbit ⊗ Hopen ⊗ Hcommit in state
|a〉|π〉|Φ(π)a 〉 for any π ∈ Kn. To be more precise, we need to introduce four measurement operators M (a)bit ,
M
(π)
open1, M
(σ)
open2, and M
(a,π,σ)
commit acting on Hbit, Hopen1, Hopen2, and Hcommit that project onto states |a〉,
|π〉, |σ〉, and |φ(π)σ,a〉, respectively. For convenience, we set M (π,σ)open ≡ M (π)open1 ⊗ M (σ)open2. Let M (a,π)mix be a
measurement operator acting on Hopen2 ⊗ Hcommit projecting onto state |Φ(π)a 〉. Finally, we define Ma ≡∑
π∈Kn M
(a)
bit ⊗M (π)open1 ⊗M (a,π)mix for each a ∈ {0, 1}. In our argument that follows shortly, we assume that,
instead of Steps (R2)–(R5), Bob simply performs Ma in the system Hbit ⊗Hopen ⊗Hcommit. Note that the
value T
(U)
a (n) associated with Alice’s cheating strategy U coincides with ‖(I ⊗Ms)(U (s)2 ⊗ I)|η(C1)〉‖2.
Let us recall from Section 2 the notion of statistical binding. We rephrase this notion as follows. Our
quantum bit commitment scheme is statistically binding if there exists a negligible function ε(n) such that,
for any cheating strategy U = (U1, U (0)2 , U (1)2 ) of Alice, T (U)0 (n) + T (U)1 (n) ≤ 1 + ε(n) holds for every length
n ∈ N+.
We will show that our protocol achieves the statistical binding condition.
Theorem 4.4 If no polynomial-time quantum algorithm solves GA with non-negligible probability, then our
quantum bit commitment scheme is statistically binding.
To prove this theorem, we first introduce a new problem, called the hidden permutation search problem,
which is closely related to the indistinguishability between ρ
(π)
0 and ρ
(π)
1 .
Hidden Permutation Search Problem HPSP:
◦ Instance: a string 1n with n ∈ N+ and a quantum state ρ(π)0 (n) with a certain hidden permutation
π ∈ Kn.
◦ Output: π.
We say that a quantum algorithm A solves HPSP with average probability p on length n if, over all
permutations π ∈ Kn chosen uniformly at random, A takes instance (1n, ρ(π)0 (n)) and outputs π with
probability exactly p.
Lemma 4.5 Assume that there exist a cheating strategy U of Alice and a positive polynomial p satisfying
T
(U)
0 (n) + T
(U)
1 (n) ≥ 1 + 1/p(n) for infinitely-many lengths n. Then, there exist a positive polynomial q
and a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that solves HPSP with average probability at least 1/q(n) for
infinitely-many lengths n.
Because the proof of Lemma 4.5 requires a special treatment, we will give it in the next section.
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Lemma 4.6 If there are a positive polynomial p and a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that solves
HPSP with average probability at least 1/p(n) for infinitely-many n, then there are a positive polynomial q
and a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that solves 2-QSCDff with average advantage at least 1/q(n) for
infinitely-many lengths n.
Proof. Let p be a positive polynomial and let A be a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that solves
HPSP with probability at least 1/p(n). Let ρ⊗ ρ with ρ ∈ {ρ(π)0 , ρ(π)1 } be an instance of 2-QSCDff , where π
is an unknown permutation in Kn. Let s ∈ {0, 1} and assume that ρ = ρ(π)s . Now, our task is to determine
whether s = 0 or s = 1.
Let A0 be a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that generates π from input (1n, ρ(π)0 ) with probability,
say, γn, which is at least 1/p(n). Let A1 be a quantum algorithm that takes input ρ(π)1 , transforms ρ(π)1 to
ρ
(π)
0 by running P2, and finally apply A0. Obviously, A1 outputs π with the same probability as A0 with
ρ
(π)
0 . Now, let us consider input ρ
(π)
s ⊗ ρ(π)s with unknown values s and π.
Using the first state ρ = ρ
(π)
s , we obtain π as follows. Consider a purification |Φ〉 = |Φ(π)s 〉 of ρ. Starting
with |0〉|Φ〉, apply H ⊗ I to obtain 1√
2
(|0〉|Φ〉 + |1〉|Φ〉). We apply A0 and A1 separately to generate
1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ (I ⊗A0)|Φ〉 + |1〉 ⊗ (I ⊗A1)|Φ〉). It follows that
∑
κ∈Kn |0〉|κ〉|ξκ,0〉 +
∑
κ∈Kn |1〉|κ〉|ξκ,1〉. By our
assumption, we obtain ‖|ξπ,s〉‖2 = γn for every s ∈ {0, 1}.
Next, we apply CSPA to the second register and the second input state ρ
(π)
s ; that is, |κ〉〈κ| ⊗ ρ(π)s . If
κ = π, this process produces |s〉〈s| ⊗ ρ(π)s . Finally, we observe the first register and output its content s. If κ
is different from π, then after running CSPA, we observe 0 and 1 with equal probability, as we have argued
in Section 3.2.
Therefore, the probability that we correctly obtain s is exactly 12 (1 − γn) + γn = 12 + γn2 . Calling the
entire quantum algorithm by B, we have just proven that Prob[B(1n, ρ(π)s ⊗ ρ(π)s ) = s] = 12 + γn2 . From this
equation, it follows that
∣∣∣Prob[B(1n, ρ(π)0 ⊗ ρ(π)0 ) = 1]− Prob[B(1n, ρ(π)1 ⊗ ρ(π)1 ) = 1]∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣
(
1
2
− γn
2
)
−
(
1
2
+
γn
2
)∣∣∣∣ = γn.
Since γn ≥ 1/p(n), the lemma follows. ✷
Using the above lemmas, we can prove Theorem 4.4.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We want to show the contrapositive of the theorem. First, assume that there
exist a positive polynomial p and Alice’s cheating strategy U = (U1, U (0)2 , I) such that T (U)0 (n) + T (U)1 (n) ≥
1 + 1/p(n) for infinitely-many lengths n. By Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6, we conclude that 2-QSCDff can be
solved by a certain polynomial-time quantum algorithm with average advantage at least 1/q(n) for a certain
polynomial q. By Lemma 4.3, GA must be solved on a quantum computer in polynomial time with average
probability at least 1/r(n) for a certain polynomial r. ✷
5 Quantum Algorithm for HPSP
In the previous section, we have left Lemma 4.5 unproven. Here, we will give its missing proof by constructing
an appropriate quantum algorithm that solves HPSP with non-negligible probability, provided that the
statistically binding condition does not hold.
Recall that adversarial Alice takes (U1, U
(0)
2 , U
(1)
2 ) as her cheating strategy. To simplify our analysis, as
in [8], we replace (U1, U
(0)
2 , U
(1)
2 ) by (U˜1, U˜
(0)
2 , I), where U˜1 = (U
(1)
2 ⊗ Icommit)U1 and U˜ (0)2 = U (0)2 (U (1)2 )†,
without changing the probability that Alice successfully cheats Bob. For convenience, hereafter, we write U1
and U
(0)
2 (without “tilde”) for U˜1 and U˜
(0)
2 , respectively, and deal only with U = (U1, U (0)2 , I) as adversarial
Alice’s cheating strategy, where U
(1)
2 = I.
5.1 Distillation Algorithm
We will present an important subroutine that makes up of the quantum algorithm that solves HPSP in
Section 5.2. Recall that adversarial Alice is now taking the cheating strategy U = (U1, U (0)2 , I), while Bob
faithfully follows the protocol.
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Let us recall from Eq. (2) that |η(C1)〉 is of the form ∑π∈Kn∑σ,τ∈S(pi)n ∑a,s∈{0,1} |ξ(τ,s)a,π,σ〉|a〉|π〉|σ〉|φ(π)τ,s 〉,
which is obtained by an application of U1 ⊗ I to |0〉 in the entire system Hall = H(C1)A ⊗H(C1)B . Note that
T
(U)
1 (n) = ‖(I ⊗M1)|η(C1)〉‖2 since U (1)2 = I. For convenience, we define |η(C1)perf 〉 to be the normalized state
of (I ⊗M1)|η(C1)〉; that is, |η(C1)perf 〉 = 1√
T
(U)
1 (n)
(I ⊗M1)|η(C1)〉. This is an ideal quantum state for adversarial
Alice because, from this state, Alice unveils 1 with certainty. By the definition of M1, we can assume that
|η(C1)perf 〉 has the form
∑
π∈Kn |ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|Φ
(π)
1 〉 with
∑
π∈Kn ‖|ξ1,π〉‖2 = 1.
Now, we will demonstrate how to implement I ⊗M1 algorithmically and distill |η(C1)perf 〉 from |η(C1)〉 using
the measurement in the computational basis.
Distillation Algorithm Adis:
(D1) Prepare an additional register in state |0〉 in H2. Given |0〉|η(C1)〉 in H2 ⊗H(C1)A , we focus on a term
|ξ(τ,s)a,π,σ〉|a〉|π〉|σ〉|φ(π)τ,s 〉 in the subsystem H(C1)A . We measure the second register in state |1〉. The state
collapses to |ξ(τ,s)1,π,σ〉|1〉|π〉|σ〉|φ(π)τ,s 〉.
(D2) Transform |0〉|π〉|φ(π)τ,s 〉 in H2⊗Hopen2⊗Hcommit to |s〉|π〉|φ(π)τ,s 〉 by applying PSPA given in Section 3.2.
Measure the first register in state |1〉. We then obtain |ξ(τ,1)1,π,σ〉|1〉|π〉|φ(π)τ,1 〉.
(D3) Change |φ(π)τ,1 〉 to |φ(π)τ,0 〉 by applying P2. Prepare |id〉 and transform |π〉|id〉|φ(π)τ,1 〉 in Hopen1 ⊗ HSn ⊗
Hcommit to |π〉|τ〉|id〉 by applying P−11 . We then obtain |ξ(τ,1)1,π,σ〉|π〉|τ〉|id〉. Measure the fourth register
in state |σ〉 to obtain |ξ(σ,1)1,π,σ〉|π〉|σ〉|id〉.
(D4) Apply P1 to |σ〉|π〉|id〉 in Hopen ⊗Hcommit to obtain |π〉|σ〉|φ(π)σ,1〉.
It is not difficult to see that the above algorithm Adis transforms |η(C1)〉 into a quantum state |η(C1)perf 〉
with probability T
(U)
1 (n) = ‖(I ⊗M1)|η(C1)〉‖2.
In the following argument, we are focused on |η(C1)perf 〉. Now, we fix a permutation π′ ∈ Kn, which is
a hidden permutation of an instance ρ
(π)
0 of HPSP. Note that the Hilbert space span{|φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉 | σ ∈ Sn} is
determined by a basis B(π′)0 = {|φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉 | σ ∈ S(π
′)
n }, where S(π
′)
n is defined in Section 3.1. First, we want
to measure Hcommit in states |φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉 for an arbitrary permutation σ ∈ S(π
′)
n . This is formally done by a
measurement operator M˜π′ ≡
∑
σ∈S(pi′)n M
(0,σ,π′)
commit , which projects a quantum state in Hcommit onto |φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉’s.
Letting |η(π′)〉 = (I ⊗ M˜π′)|η(C1)perf 〉, we want to determine an actual form of |η(π
′)〉. For brevity, we set
ωn =
|Kn|+1√
2|Sn|(|Kn|−1)
.
Lemma 5.1 For each fixed π′ ∈ Kn, |η(π′)〉 = ωn
∑
σ∈Sn
∑
π∈Kn |ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ
(π)
σ,1〉|φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉.
Proof. As the first step, we intend to express |η(C1)perf 〉 in terms of |φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉. Recall that |η(C1)perf 〉 =
1√
|Sn|
∑
σ∈Sn
∑
π∈Kn |ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|σ〉|φ
(π)
σ,1〉. For convenience, let |Θπ,σ〉 = 1√|Sn| |ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|σ〉 and δ =
1
|Kn|−1 . Since |η
(C1)
perf 〉 =
∑
π∈Kn |ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|Φ
(π)
1 〉, |η(C1)perf 〉 can be expressed as
∑
π,σ |Θπ,σ〉|φ(π)σ,1〉. Since
|φ(π)σ,1〉 = δ
∑
κ∈Kn(|φ
(κ)
σ,0〉 − |φ(κ)σπ,0〉) by Lemma 3.2, |η(C1)perf 〉 is written as δ
∑
κ∈Kn
∑
π,σ |Θπ,σ〉|φ(κ)σ,0〉 −
δ
∑
κ∈Kn
∑
π,σ |Θπ,σ〉|φ(κ)σπ,0〉. Since
∑
π,σ |Θπ,σ〉|φ(κ)σπ,0〉 equals
∑
π,σ |Θπ,σπ〉|φ(κ)σ,0〉, the state |η(C1)perf 〉 is fur-
ther written as
|η(C1)perf 〉 = δ
∑
κ∈Kn
∑
σ∈Sn
∑
π∈Kn
(|Θπ,σ〉 − |Θπ,σπ〉)|φ(κ)σ,0〉 =
δ
√
2√
|Sn|
∑
κ
∑
σ
∑
π
|ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ(π)σ,1〉|φ(κ)σ,0〉, (3)
since |Θπ,σ〉 − |Θπ,σπ〉 = 1√|Sn| |ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉(|σ〉 − |σπ〉) =
√
2√
|Sn|
|ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ(π)σ,1〉.
Obviously, if σ ∈ S(π′)n , then M˜π′ |φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉 = |φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉 holds. When σ ∈ Sn − S(π
′)
n , we obtain M˜π′ |φ(π
′)
σπ′,0〉 =
M˜π′ |φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉 = |φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉 = |φ(π
′)
σπ′,0〉. Let κ ∈ Kn − {π′}. For any σ ∈ S(π
′)
n , since 〈φ(π
′)
σ,0 |φ(κ)σ,0〉 = 12 by Lemma
11
3.1(4), it follows that M˜π′ |φ(κ)σ,0〉 = 12 |φ
(π′)
σ,0 〉. Moreover, since Lemma 3.1(4) implies 〈φ(π
′)
σ,0 |φ(κ)σπ′,0〉 = 12 , we
obtain M˜π′ |φ(κ)σπ′,0〉 = 12 |φ
(π′)
σ,0 〉, which equals 12 |φ
(π′)
σπ′,0〉. Overall, it holds that M˜π′ |φ(κ)σ,0〉 = 12 |φ
(π′)
σ,0 〉 for all
permutations σ ∈ Sn.
Since |η(π′)〉 = (I ⊗ M˜π′)|η(C1)perf 〉, from Eq. (3), |η(π
′)〉 is expressed as
|η(π′)〉 = δ
√
2√
|Sn|

∑
σ
∑
π
|ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ(π)σ,1〉|φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉+
1
2
∑
σ
∑
π
∑
κ:κ 6=π′
|ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ(π)σ,1〉|φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉


=
δ
√
2√
|Sn|
[∑
σ
∑
π
|ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ(π)σ,1〉|φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉+
|Kn| − 1
2
∑
σ
∑
π
|ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ(π)σ,1〉|φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉
]
=
δ
√
2√
|Sn|
· |Kn|+ 1
2
∑
σ
∑
π
|ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ(π)σ,1〉|φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉.
Therefore, we obtain |η(π′)〉 = |Kn|+1√
2|Sn|(|Kn|−1)
∑
σ
∑
π |ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ(π)σ,1〉|φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉 by the definition of δ. ✷
For convenience, we denote by |η(π′)norm〉 the normalized state of |η(π′)〉, i.e., |η(π
′)
norm〉 = 1‖|η(pi′)〉‖ |η(π
′)〉.
Lemma 5.2 |η(π′)norm〉 = ω′n
∑
σ∈Sn
∑
π∈Kn |ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ
(π)
σ,1〉|φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉, where ω′n = 1√|Sn|(1−‖|ξ1,pi′ 〉‖2) .
Proof. We want to estimate the value ‖|η(π′)〉‖. First, we claim that (*) ‖|η(π′)〉‖2 = (1−‖|ξ1,pi′〉‖
2)(|Kn|+1)2
2(|Kn|−1)2 .
If this claim is true, then |η(π′)norm〉 is written as
|η(π′)norm〉 =
[(
|Kn|+ 1√
2|Sn|(|Kn| − 1)
)
/
(√
1− ‖|ξ1,π′〉‖2(|Kn|+ 1)√
2(|Kn| − 1)
)]∑
σ
∑
π
|ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ(π)σ,1〉|φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉
=
1√
|Sn|
√
1− ‖|ξ1,π′〉‖2
∑
σ
∑
π
|ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ(π)σ,1〉|φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉.
The aforementioned claim (*) will be proven as follows. First, we note that ‖|η(π′)〉‖2 equals
ω2n
∑
σ,τ
∑
π ‖|ξ1,π〉‖2(〈φ(π
′)
σ,0 |〈φ(π)σ,1 |)(|φ(π)τ,1 〉〈φ(π
′)
τ,0 |), which is ω2n
∑
σ,π ‖|ξ1,π〉‖2[
∑
τ 〈φ(π)σ,1 |φ(π)τ,1 〉〈φ(π
′)
σ,0 |φ(π
′)
τ,0 〉]. By
Lemma 3.1, 〈φ(π)σ,1 |φ(π)τ,1 〉 = 1 if τ = σ; −1 if τ = σπ; 0 otherwise. Moreover, 〈φ(π
′)
σ,0 |φ(π
′)
τ,0 〉 = 1 if τ = σ or
τ = σπ′; 0 otherwise. Thus, it follows that ‖|η(π′)〉‖2 = ω2n
∑
π:π 6=π′ ‖|ξ1,π〉‖2[
∑
σ〈φ(π)σ,1 |φ(π)σ,1〉〈φ(π
′)
σ,0 |φ(π
′)
σ,0 〉] =
ω2n
∑
π:π 6=π′ ‖|ξ1,π〉‖2 · |Sn|. Since
∑
π:π 6=π′ ‖|ξ1,π〉‖2 = 1 − ‖|ξ1,π′〉‖2, we obtain ‖|η(π
′)〉‖2 = ω2n|Sn|(1 −
‖|ξ1,π′〉‖2). By the definition of ωn, the lemma follows. ✷
In the subsequent subsection, we will explain how to solve HPSP efficiently on a quantum computer.
5.2 HPSP Algorithm
To solve HPSP, we first generate a quantum state |η(π′)norm〉 with an appropriate probability, apply U (0)2 , and
finally measure selected qubits. The following quantum algorithm AHPSP behaves exactly as described. In
what follows, we tend to drop superscript “U” from T (U)s for brevity.
HPSP Algorithm AHPSP :
(M1) Assume that we are given a quantum state ρ = ρ
(π′)
0 with an unknown permutation π
′ ∈ Kn. We
consider its purification of the form |Φ(π′)0 〉 = 1√|Sn|
∑
τ∈Sn |τ〉|φ
(π′)
τ,0 〉 = 1√|Sn|
∑
τ∈Sn |φ
(π′)
τ,0 〉|τ〉. Since
we are given only a reduced state ρ, we assume that we are allowed to manipulate only the first register
of |Φ(π)0 〉. Starting with |0〉, we apply U1 ⊗ I and then run Adis. We then obtain
√
T1(n)|η(C1)〉; that
is,
√
T1(n)√
|Sn|
∑
σ,π |ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|σ〉|φ(π)σ,1〉 ⊗ 1√|Sn|
∑
τ |τ〉|φ(π
′)
τ,0 〉.
(M2) Transform |π〉|σ〉|φ(π)σ,1〉 into |π〉|σ〉|id〉 by running P2 and P−11 . Now, we obtain√
T1(n)√
|Sn|
∑
σ,π |ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|σ〉|id〉 ⊗ 1√|Sn|
∑
τ |τ〉|φ(π
′)
τ,0 〉.
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(M3) Swap two registers |σ〉|id〉 and |τ〉|φ(π′)τ,0 〉 to obtain
√
T1(n)√
|Sn|
∑
τ,π |ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|τ〉|φ(π
′)
τ,0 〉⊗ 1√|Sn|
∑
σ |σ〉|id〉.
(M4) Transform |π〉|τ〉 into |π〉|φ(π)τ,1 〉 by applying P1. Moreover, transform 1√|Sn|
∑
σ |σ〉|id〉 into |id〉|id〉.
The current state is now of the from
√
T1(n)√
|Sn|
∑
τ,π |ξ1,π〉|1〉|π〉|φ(π)τ,1 〉|φ(π
′)
τ,0 〉 ⊗ |id〉|id〉, which equals√
T1(n)(1− ‖|ξ1,π′〉‖2)|η(π
′)
norm〉 ⊗ |id〉|id〉 by Lemma 5.2.
(M5) Apply U
(0)
2 ⊗ I to the subsystem H(R1)A ⊗H(R1)B .
(M6) Measure Hbit ⊗Hopen1. Whenever we observe (a, π), if a 6= 0, then reject. Otherwise, output π.
To complete the proof of Lemma 4.5, it suffices to show that the success probability pπ′ of obtaining
π′ from ρ(π
′)
0 by running AHPSP , over all π ∈ Kn chosen uniformly at random, is at least 18p(n)2 . This
statement follows from two separate claims. The first claim below makes a bridge between the probability
pπ′ and the state (I ⊗M0)(U (0)2 ⊗ I)(I ⊗M1)|η(C1)〉.
Claim 1 For any fixed π′ ∈ Kn, the success probability pπ′ of obtaining π′ from ρ(π
′)
0 by running AHPSP is
at least 2(1− 2|Kn|+1 )2‖(I ⊗M0)(U
(0)
2 ⊗ I)(I ⊗M1)|η(C1)〉‖2.
Proof. Recall that M˜π′ ≡
∑
σ∈S(pi′)n M
(0,σ,π′)
commit and Ma ≡
∑
π∈Kn M
(a)
bit ⊗M (π)open1 ⊗M (a,π)mix for each index
a ∈ {0, 1}. Since two operators I ⊗ M˜π′ and U (0)2 ⊗ I are commutable, it follows that
(I ⊗ M˜π′)(U (0)2 ⊗ I)|η(C1)perf 〉 = (U (0)2 ⊗ I)(I ⊗ M˜π′)|η(C1)perf 〉 = (U (0)2 ⊗ I)|η(π
′)〉.
Since I ⊗M0 = (I ⊗M0)(I ⊗ M˜π′), we obtain
(I ⊗M0)(U (0)2 ⊗ I)|η(C1)perf 〉 = (I ⊗M0)(I ⊗ M˜π′)(U (0)2 ⊗ I)|η(C1)perf 〉 = (I ⊗M0)(U (0)2 ⊗ I)|η(π
′)〉.
Through Steps (M1)–(M4), we generates
√
T1(n)(1 − ‖|ξ1,π′〉‖2)|η(π
′)
norm〉. From Steps (M5)–(M6), the
success probability pπ′ for a fixed π
′ is exactly ‖√T1(n)(1 − ‖|ξ1,π′〉)‖2)(I ⊗M0)(U (0)2 ⊗ I)|η(π′)norm〉‖2. By the
proof of Lemma 5.2, it holds that |η(π′)norm〉 =
√
2(|Kn|−1)√
1−‖|ξ1,pi′ 〉‖2(|Kn+1)
|η(π′)〉. Thus, pπ′ equals ‖
√
2T1(n)(|Kn|−1)
|Kn|+1 (I⊗
M0)(U
(0)
2 ⊗ I)|η(C1)perf 〉‖2, which is 2(|Kn|−1)
2
(|Kn|+1)2 ‖(I ⊗ M0)(U
(0)
2 ⊗ I)(I ⊗ M1)|η(C1)〉‖2 since
√
T1(n)|η(C1)perf 〉 =
(I ⊗M1)|η(C1)〉.
✷
Claim 2 ‖(I ⊗M0)(U (0)2 ⊗ I)(I ⊗M1)|η(C1)〉‖2 ≥ 1/4p(n)2.
Proof. For simplicity, we write ε for 1/p(n). It holds that ‖(I ⊗ M0)(U (0)2 ⊗ I)(I ⊗M1)|η(C1)〉‖2 ≥
(
√
T0 −
√
1− T1)2 by an argument similar to [8, Lemma 4]. Since T0 − ε ≥ 1 − T1, it follows that
√
T0 −√
1− T1 ≥
√
T0 −
√
T0 − ε =
√
T0(1 −
√
1− ε
T0
). Since
√
1− x ≤ 1 − x2 for any real number x ≤ 1,√
T0(1−
√
1− ε
T0
) ≥ √T0 · ε2T0 = ε2√T0 ≥
ε
2 since T0 ≤ 1. Hence, we conclude that (
√
T0 −
√
1− T1)2 ≥ ε24 ,
as requested. ✷
By combining Claims 1 and 2, we obtain the desired consequence that the success probability of obtaining
π′ from ρ(π
′)
0 by running AHPSP is at least 2(1− 2|Kn|+1 )2 · 14p(n)2 ≥ 2 · (12 )2 · 14p(n)2 ≥ 18p(n)2 for any number
n ≥ 3.
6 A Brief Discussion on Our Protocol
Through Sections 4–5, we have shown that our quantum bit commitment scheme achieves computational
concealing and statistical binding at communication cost of O(n log n), where n is a security parameter, since
Alice sends the information on (a, σ, π, |φ(π)σ,a〉) to Bob during the two phases and the permutations σ and π
are expressed using O(n logn) bits. Although our protocol requires a weaker assumption than that of [8],
13
the communication cost is larger. For a practical application, it is better to reduce the communication cost
as in the case of, for example, [14].
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